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stormwater flows. In February 2002 Markowitz submitted a revised application for GP6, and POND again submitted additional materials in
opposition of Markowitz's application. DEP responded to POND's
submitted materials by indicating that DEP's on-site inspections did
not find any evidence to support an opinion that the wetlands were not
isolated. Consequently, DEP issued the GP6 in May 2003 and concluded a portion of the land contained isolated wetlands and that these
wetlands could be disturbed for the construction project.
The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, concluded
DEP's permitting process was quasijudicial and, thus, DEP needed to
engage in fact-finding to the extent required by statute or regulation.
The court also determined all FWPA permitting actions required certain fact-finding consistent with statutory criteria and reflected in the
record. The court pointed to evidence POND provided, including
POND's engineering expert, and decided an abundance of factual material contrary to DEP's determinations existed. The court also noted
its discomfort with the fact that DEP's 1986 Freshwater Wetlands map
reflected the wetlands in question as part of the inland tributary system
and that DEP's on-site visits took place during a dry period. The court
further stated that statutes and regulations did not define "sheet flow"
and "concentrated flow," and DEP failed to provide significantly distinct definitions of these two different types of flows. Because ample
evidence of water flowing from Markowitz's property existed, and due
to DEP's failure to distinguish the evidence as "sheet flow" or "concentrated flow," the court remanded the case to DEP for further factfinding and analysis to address the court's concerns.
Laura L. Chartrand
NEW MEXICO
State v. City of Las Vegas, 89 P.3d 47 (N.M. 2004) (overturning the
pueblo rights doctrine for inconsistency with the doctrines of prior
appropriation and beneficial use).
This case arose through the course of adjudicating water rights on
the Gallinas River when the New Mexico state engineer sought a declaration of the City of Las Vegas' ("City') water rights based on the
pueblo rights doctrine. The state engineer argued the inapplicability
of this doctrine in New Mexico, thus prohibiting the City's water right
entitlement under the doctrine's invocation. The Court of Appeals of
New Mexico did not follow the precedent of Cartwrightv. Public Service
Company of New Mexico, but instead offered an opinion to aid the New
Mexico Supreme Court's further independent consideration. Specifically, the appellate court expressed reservations over reconciliation
between the pueblo rights doctrine and the prior appropriation doctrine.
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Accordingly, the court held the pueblo rights doctrine offended
the doctrine of prior appropriation and beneficial use, the latter being
the basis of New Mexico water law. The court stated that for all appropriations of public water, including municipalities, the proper measurement for a water right was beneficial use within a reasonable time
after appropriation and the pueblo rights doctrine contradicted this
timeliness requirement by allowing indefinite expansion of a water
right to accommodate changing municipal needs. Therefore, the
court determined the pueblo rights doctrine encouraged underutilization of public water and prevented efficient and economic water use
both of which were antithetical to the doctrine of prior appropriation
and, therefore, contradicted New Mexico's established water law principles.
In overruling Cartwright's precedent, the court addressed issues of
stare decisis and prior reliance concerns. Regarding stare decisis, the
court stated because Cartwrightwas inconsistent with prior appropriation and did not establish a rule of property, following Cartwrightwould
be more injurious than not. The court reasoned following an incorrect principle established by case law was more injurious than overruling the case law and establishing a new, correct principle. Furthermore, regarding issues of reliance on the Cartwright rule, the court
stated, overruling Cartwrightdid not take away the City's colonization
grant water right, as the City retained vested rights in all water put to
beneficial use within a reasonable time after appropriation.
Finally, the court considered the City's argument that the court
should only apply the overruling of Cartwrightprospectively. To make
this determination, the court considered three factors: (1) whether the
ruling announced a new principal of law, (2) whether retroactive application would advance or hinder the purposes of the new rule, and
(3) whether prospective application of the new rule was necessary to
avoid injustice. Accordingly, the court determined because its ruling
clearly announced a new rule of law, a prospective application of the
new rule frustrated prior appropriation and was, therefore, not necessary to avoid injustice. However, the court noted the City's reliance
interest was substantial. Thus, the court ordered retroactive application of its decision with limited prospective application to the City: the
City could no longer claim a pueblo water right, but the City was entifled to an equitable remedy that balanced its reasonable reliance interests with the other interests of Gallinas River appropriators. Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the district court to complete the
balancing test above and determine the specifics of the City's equitable
remedy.
Amy Mockenhaupt

